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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

IS A UNION'S AGREEMENT, AS PART OF A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
AGREEMENT
THAT
REQUIRES
BARGAININGUNIT MEMBERS TO SUBMIT STATUTORY
RIGHTS DISPUTES TO BINDING ARBITRATION,
ENFORCEABLE?

II.

SHOULD DISPARATE
IMPACT LIABILITY BE
RECOGNIZED UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994), AND, IF SO,
HAS RESPONDENT SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING
BUSINESS NECESSITY?
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While Gilmer allows binding arbitration of
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-against-

PUERTA PACIFIC COLLEGE,
Respondent.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The findings of the arbitrator, dated March 14, 1996, and
opinions of the United States District Court for the District of Wagner,
dated June 19, 1996, are not officially reported but are contained in the
record. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth Circuit is officially reported at 600 F.3d 322 (13th Cir. 1996)
and is contained in the record.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The appendix sets forth the text of the following statutory
provisions: 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994); 29 U.S.C.
§ 623 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(1994); 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1986) (repealed 1987); 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(D) (1996); and 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Proceedings
1. Decision of the Arbitrator
In October of 1995, Puerta Pacific College terminated Julie
McCoy. (R. at 3.) Ms. McCoy approached her shop steward, Berle
Smith, about filing a grievance against the College, complaining that
Puerta Pacific's "Profit Plan" violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994), as it
discriminates against teachers with greater experience, most of whom
will be over the age of forty. (R. at 3.) Ms. McCoy's union, the
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American Union of College Professors ("AUCP"), filed a grievance on
behalf of the Petitioner, alleging discriminatory practices by the College
in violation of the ADEA. (R. at 3.) Ms. McCoy also filed a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging a
violation of the ADEA. (R. at 3.) The EEOC conducted an
investigation of Puerta Pacific, but declined to sue on Ms. McCoy's
behalf, instead issuing her a right to sue letter. (R. at 3.)
In the written memorandum accompanying his resolution of the
grievance, Arbitrator Isaac Washington held that the ADEA does not
recognize disparate impact claims. (R. at 5.) The Petitioner then sued
in United States District Court, alleging an independent federal remedy
for her age claim. (R. at 9.)

2. District Court
The United States District Court for the District of Wagner,
adopting the factual findings of Arbitrator Washington in their entirety,
first turned to the issue of whether the Petitioner could maintain her
ADEA claim in federal court after previously obtaining an adverse
ruling in arbitration. (R. at 9-14.) According to District Judge Charo,
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and its progeny
declare that unions cannot, through a collective bargaining agreement,
waive the rights of individual employees to bring statutory
discriminationclaims in federal court. (R. at 11-14.) Furthermore, the
court held that disparate impact claims are recognized under the ADEA.
(R. at 14-15.) Although Judge Charo found that Ms. McCoy had
established a prima facie case under the Age Act, she ruled that Puerta
Pacific had also proved its "Profit Plan" was justified on grounds of
business necessity. (R. at 17.) Thus, the District Court entered
judgment for Puerta Pacific College. (R. at 17.) Petitioner subsequently
sought review of the District Court's decision by the United States Court
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of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit. (R. at 19-20.)

3. Court of Appeals
The Thirteenth Circuit declined to reach the merits of Ms.
McCoy's ADEA claim, as it held that under the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991),
the Petitioner's sole remedial outlet was arbitration. (R. at 23.) Judge
Tatoo DePlaine, writing for the court, held that Gilmer is not limited to
the context of agreements made by individual employees to arbitrate
statutory claims, but rather extends to collective bargaining agreements
as well. (R. at 21.) Moreover, the court dismissed the Supreme Court's
concerns in Gardner-Denver that subjecting individual statutory rights
to the collective bargaining process would threaten workers' ability to
meaningfully pursue their claims. (R. at 22.) According to Judge
DePlaine, any threat that an employee's union may prefer the collective
over the individual is largely eliminated by the union's duty of fair
representation to its members. (R. at 22.) The court thus ruled in favor
of the College without reaching the merits of Ms. McCoy's claims. (R.
at 22.) From this decision, Petitioner appeals to the United States
Supreme Court.

B. Statement of the Facts
Petitioner Julie McCoy is a forty-seven-year-old woman whose
education and experience place her among the most highly qualified
professors in Puerta Pacific College's School of Criminal Justice. (R. at
1.) Because she had spoken often at Puerta Pacific and enjoyed a
excellent professional relationship with the College's administration,Ms.
McCoy seriously entertained a standing offer of employment from
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Sylvia Spelling, the Presidentof Puerta Pacific. (R. at 2.) In-July 1995,
Ms. McCoy contacted Ms. Spelling to further discuss the possibility that
Petitioner become a professor at Puerta Pacific. (R. at 2.)
While Ms. McCoy was enjoying exceptional success in her
police work, Puerta Pacific was experiencing financial challenges. (R.
at 2.) The College's student enrollment dropped significantly between
1989 and 1991. (R. at 2.) In response, the College laid off 250
employees in 199 1, many from the School of Criminal Justice. (R. at 2.)
This reduction in force proved an effective cost-saving measure, and the
College soon began to notice an improvement in its financial position.
(R. at 2.) In fact, in recent years Puerta Pacific has resumed hiring new
professors. (R. at 2.)
Nevertheless, Puerta Pacific's Board of Trustees feared the
economic upswing the College was experiencing would be short-lived
and, in January 1994, the Board voted unanimously to implement a
"Profit Plan" in an effort to avoid future layoffs. (R. at 2.) The Profit
Plan is comprised of two parts. Part One creates an endowment fund,
the goal of which is to raise $5 million for the college by the year 2000.
(R. at 2.) Puerta Pacific has been aggressive in its fundraising efforts
and has raised $3.7 million toward its $5 million goal in only two years.
(R. at 2.)
Despite Puerta Pacific's strong fundraising ability, the Board
continued to fear financial troubles and implemented Part Two of its
Profit Plan, establishing a rigid salary structure. (R. at 2.) Under the
new salary structure, a professor's salary is based on his or her years of
teaching or relevant work experience, (R. at 6-7), and no new professor
may be hired with more than five years' experience, which equates to an
annual salary of no more than $28,000. (R. at 2.) Interestingly, a
professor with significant experience, whose talents and credentials
should be most highly prized for their potential effect on eager students,
is instead disqualified from available positions.
Shocked by the restrictive new Profit Plan, Puerta Pacific's
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professors sought the assistance of the American Union of College
Professors in August 1994. (R. at 2.) After the Board's implementation
of the Profit Plan, the AUCP negotiated a contract with the College
which protects all of the school's professors, and today is incorporated
into the Profit Plan. (R. at 2.)
The Profit Plan and the collective bargaining agreement were in
place when Ms. McCoy interviewed with Ms. Spelling in 1995 to fill an
advertised Assistant Professor of Criminology position. (R. at 3.)
Because of Ms. McCoy's superior qualifications, Ms. Spelling hired her
for the vacant position, offering Ms. McCoy a starting annual salary of
$53,000. (R. at 3.) In October 1995, only one month after offering Ms.
McCoy the professorship, the College hired Vicki Stubing, a twentyeight-year-old patrol officer, for the same position. (R. at 3.) Ms.
Stubing's lesser experience relegated her to a much lower starting salary
under the Profit Plan, and the College was able to hire Ms. Stubing at
only $27,000 a year, slightly more than half Ms. McCoy's salary. (R. at
3.) After hiring Ms. Stubing, Puerta Pacific promptly fired Ms. McCoy
without offering her an alternative position. (R. at 3.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Although Congress and the Supreme Court generally encourage
the resolution of labor disputes through non-judicial mechanisms such
as arbitration, according to the Court's holding in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. and the cases which follow it, alternate dispute resolution of
controversies arising out of the employment relationship is not always
appropriate. In a union workplace, the grievance-arbitration machinery
is ill-equipped to protect the uniquely individual nature of rights
enshrined in discrimination statutes such as the ADEA, given that in
many circumstances an employee's bargaining representative must
subordinate the good of a particular individual to that of the collective.
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As a result of the tension between the individual and the collective, the
Court has repeatedly held that clauses contained in collective bargaining
agreements which submit statutory rights grievances to binding and final
arbitration are not enforceable.
This principle was recognized by the Court in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. Although the employee there was held
to his agreement to arbitrate employment related-disputes contained in
a securities exchange application, the Court expressly distinguished
individual contracts from those which are collectively-bargained.
Moreover, Gilmer rests to a significant degree upon the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which mandates the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate between merchants. The FAA, however, does
not govern the operation of arbitration clauses contained in collective
bargaining agreements.
Thus, Gilmer's holding that statutory
discrimination claims may be submitted to binding arbitration does not
extend to employees working under collectively-bargained contracts,
and thus Petitioner should be allowed to pursue a remedy in federal
court.
Once in court, Ms. McCoy has a valid disparate impact claim
under the ADEA, given the adverse affect the College's Profit Plan has
on older employees with more experience. Petitioner demonstrated, and
the district court recognized, that under the Plan, higher salaries are
mandatory for experienced professors and only a small percentage of
older employers are eligible for certain lower-paying positions at the
College. Experienced professors are not given the option of accepting
a lower salary, but instead are denied employment altogether.
Excluding older employees from employment, even
unintentionally, violates the purpose of the ADEA as expressed in
legislative history and subsequent case law. The substantive provisions
of the ADEA were modeled after Title VII, which has recognized
disparate impact claims since 1973 and was amended in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 to explicitly incorporate the disparate impact doctrine.
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Although Congress has not yet amended the ADEA to include an
express disparate impact provision, disparate impact claims are still
cognizable under the ADEA. The majority of courts have recognized
ADEA disparate impact claims since 1983, and should continue to do so
even after Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins. Although the Hazen Court
questioned the viability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA, it
did not prohibit them. Therefore, the precedent of the circuit courts
should control. Since Hazen, only three circuits have ruled that
disparate impact claims are no longer cognizable under the ADEA, and
the remaining jurisdictions have continued to recognize these claims,
stressing judicial precedent and the purpose behind the statute. The
abolition of disparate impact claims would severely compromise the
intent of the ADEA and would open the door to age discrimination in the
workplace.
Furthermore, although the ADEA and subsequent regulations
permit Respondent to assert a business necessity defense, courts have
consistently held that a defense based on an economic rationale fails
under the ADEA. Because Respondent's only support for its assertion
of a business necessity defense lies in its alleged financial difficulties
and a purported need to cap salaries of new professors,this Court should
find Respondent's reliance on economic motives in its discriminatory
employment decision insufficient to support its defense. In the
alternative, even if this Court determines that Respondent has a
justifiable business necessity that qualifies as a "reasonable factor other
than age," the ADEA grants Petitioner the opportunity to defeat
Respondent's defense by demonstrating that less discriminatory
alternatives were available but not employed. Respondent refused to
offer Petitionerthe professorshipat a lower salary. Instead, the College
insisted on terminating her and offering her position to a younger
applicant at a much lower salary. Respondent's failure to employ this
less discriminatory alternative invalidates its business necessity defense.

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
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ARGUMENT
1.

THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD FOLLOW THE
RATIONALE ENUNCIATED
IN GARDNERDENVER AND ITS PROGENY, AND HOLD THAT
WHERE AN EMPLOYEE WORKS UNDER A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, A
CLAIM FOR RELIEF UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATIONIN EMPLOYMENTACT IS NOT
SUBJECT TO MANDATORY ARBITRATION
REGARDLESS OF A CONTRACTUAL MANDATE
TO THE CONTRARY.
A.

The approach adopted by the Court in GardnerDenver properly refuses to enforce clauses in
collective bargaining agreements which require
binding arbitration of statutory discrimination
claims.

In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), this
Court considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to bring his Title VII
race discrimination claim in federal court. Alexander worked under a
collective bargaining agreement which proscribed discrimination against
employees based on "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or
ancestry." Id. at 39. The agreement also contained a broad clause which
declared that disputes arising between the company and the union as to
the meaning or application of the contract were subject to the grievance
procedure, and if unsettled, compulsory arbitration. Id. at 40-41. In
rejecting Gardner-Denver's contention that this language prevented
employees from vindicating statutory rights in a forum other than
arbitration, the Supreme Court cautioned that an alternate dispute
resolution mechanism may not always be appropriate in adjudicating
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claims of discriminatirn. Id. at 56. The Court noted that the role of an
arbitrator is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than that of
enacted legislation. Id. at 57. Moreover, "the specialized competence
of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land." Id. The Court observed as well that arbitral factfinding is not the
equivalent of judicial factfinding. Id. at 57-58. Perhaps most
significantly, the Court noted that under a collective bargaining
agreement, the employee's union, rather than the employee, controls the
prosecution of a grievance:
A further concern is the union's exclusive'control over
the manner and extent to which an individual grievance
is presented. In arbitration, as in the collectivebargaining process, the interests of the individual
employee may be subordinated to the collective
interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.
Moreover, harmony of interest between the union and
the individual employee cannot always be presumed,
especially where a claim of racial discrimination is
made. And a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation may prove difficult to establish. In this
respect it is noteworthy that Congress thought it
necessary to afford the protections of Title VII against
unions as well as employers.
Id. at 58 n.19. Thus, the Gardner-Denver Court emphasized both the
procedural inability of the arbitral process to protect statutory rights as
well as the inherent need for the safeguards of a federal cause of action
where an employee's charge of discrimination would otherwise be
controlled by his or her union rather than the discriminatee himself or
herself. According to the Supreme Court, employees working under a
contract which requires arbitration of discrimination claims should be
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allowed to "pursue fully both ... [remedies] ... under the grievance-

arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement and.., under
Title VII." Id. at 59-60.
In Barrentinev, Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.. Inc., 450 U.S. 728
(1981), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Gardner-Denver.
The Court in Barrentine addressed whether an employee could bring an
action in federal court alleging a violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA") after unsuccessfully submitting a wage claim based on the
same facts to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement
under which he worked. Id. at 729-30. The contract stated that all
employees covered by the agreement would be paid for all time spent in
the service of the employer and that all controversies were to be
submitted to the grievance-arbitration procedure. Id. at 731 nn.3 & 5.
The petitioner truckdrivers sought compensation for pre-trip inspection
and transportation of their vehicles. Id. at 730-31.
In finding for the petitioner, the Supreme Court emphasized that
statutory claims are often inappropriate for arbitration, particularly
where the statute is designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees
to individual employees. Id. at 737. The Court based its conclusion on
many of the same misgivings concerning arbitration that motivated its
decision in Gardner-Denver: the lack of technical competence among
arbitrators with respect to discrimination law, the limited scope of
arbitral authority, and the inability of arbitrators to grant broad-remedial
relief. Id. at 742-45. Moreover, Barrentine recognized that where the
employee works under a collective bargaining agreement and his or her
union controls the presentation of the grievance, the rights Congress
sought to protect by statute may be subordinated to the needs of the
entire unit. Id. at 742. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, stated,
"[E]ven if the employee's claims were meritorious, his union might,
without breaching its duty of fair representation, reasonably and in good
faith decide not to support the claim vigorously in arbitration." Id.
This concern about the prudence of entrusting statutory
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discrimination claims to an employee's union was also expressed by
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Barrentine. Id. at 746 (Burger, J.,
dissenting). The Chief Justice argued that arbitration of general
statutory claims, such as those under the Fair Labor Standards Act, is
proper. Id.However, under Gardner-Denver, statutory discrimination
claims are only appropriately resolved in federal court. Id. at 749-50.
The Chief Justice observed:
Against a background of union discrimination [against
women and minorities], Congress was aware that, in the
context of claims under the Civil Rights Act, unions
sometimes had been the adversary of workers. Plainly,
it would not comport with the Congressional objectives
behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected
by Title VII to allow the very forces that had practiced
discriminationto contract away the right to enforce civil
rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer to
arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of
forces that had long perpetuated invidious
discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of
the chickens.
Id. Thus,.even Burger's Barrentine dissent recognized that in a union
workplace, statutory discriminationclaims may not be subject to binding
arbitration. Id.
The Gardner-Denver and Barrentine cases should control the
outcome of the instant dispute. Like the plaintiffs in both of those cases,
Julie McCoy worked under a collective bargaining agreement. (R. at 2.)
Article 47 of ihe contract negotiated by her union, the American Union
of College Professors, expressly provides that claims of discrimination
are subject to final arbitration. (R. at 10.) However, as the Court noted
in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, such arbitration clauses are not
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enforceable in a union employment setting. The vagaries of the
grievance processing machinery are simply insufficientto safeguard the
significant public policies which underlie statutory protections. Under
Gardner-Denver, Julie McCoy's right to bring her age claim in federal
court is preserved.
B.

While Gilmer allows binding arbitration of
statutory discrimination claims under individual
employment contracts, the Court expressly
reaffirmed Gardner-Denver in the context of
collective bargaining agreements.

In Gilmer v.Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991),
the Supreme Court considered whether a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act was subject to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an agreement in a securities registration
application. The employee, Gilmer, signed an application of registration
with the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") agreeing "'to arbitrate
any dispute, claim or controversy' arising between him and Interstate
'that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or other
by-laws of the organizations with which [he] register[ed]"'. Id. at 23.
The New York Stock Exchange's Rule 347 provided for arbitration of
"any controversy between a registered representative and any member
or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of
employment of such registered representative." Id. Interstate contended
that this agreement was enforceable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925 ("FAA"). Id. at 24.
The FAA's purpose was to reverse longstandingjudicial hostility
toward arbitration and to place agreements to arbitrate on equal footing
with other contracts. Id. The FAA provides that "a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such a contract or transaction ...shall be valid,
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irrevocable, and enforceable.... ." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The FAA,
however, does contain some exclusions. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Section
1"). Section 1 of the FAA declares, "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id.
The Gilmer Court declined to decide whether Section 1 applied to all
employment contracts, as the agreement containingthe arbitration clause
at issue was a securities registration application rather than an
employment agreement. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. The Court did,
however, enforce the arbitration clause pursuant to the strictures of the
FAA, stating, "it is by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject
of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA." Id. at 26.
In reaching its conclusion that statutory claims may be the
subject of binding arbitration, the Court abandoned its earlier view that
such claims were ill-suited to final resolution outside federal courts. Id.
at 34 n.5. The Gilmer Court openly repudiated the critique of the
arbitration which appeared in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, holding
that "mistrust of the arbitral process" has been undermined by recent
arbitration decisions. Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987)). "We are well past the time
when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration
....
" Id.
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)). The Court, however, did not embrace
binding arbitration as appropriate in all instances. Justice White, writing
for the majority, was careful to distinguish Gardner-Denver and its
progeny from the situation presented in Gilmer. Id. at 35. The Court
noted that Gardner-Denver and Barrentine involved issues of whether
the arbitration of a contract-based claim of discrimination precluded
subsequent judicial resolution of a statutory claim. Conversely, the
Gilmer Court considered the enforceability of an express agreement to
arbitrate statute-based charges of discrimination. Id. Justice White
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noted two even more significant distinctions between Gardner-Denver
and Gilmer:
[B]ecause the arbitration in those cases [GardnerDenver and Barrentine] occurred in the context of a
collective-bargaining agreement, the claimants there
were represented by their unions in the arbitration
proceedings. An important concern therefore was the
tension between collective representation and individual
statutory rights, a concern not applicable to the present
case. Finally, those cases were not decided under the
FAA, which . . . reflects a "liberal federal policy

favoring arbitration agreements."
Id. Thus, Gilmer establishes that under the FAA, an employee who
enters into an agreement to submit statutory discrimination claims to
binding arbitration is stripped of a later remedy in federal court.
However, Gilmer also suggests that Gardner-Denver is unaffected by its
holding and that where an employee works under a collective bargaining
agreement which commits claims of discrimination to binding
arbitration, the uncertainties of the grievance-arbitrationprocess require
that an employee retain his or her federal cause of action. Id. at 35.
The Gilmer decision has no bearing on the resolution ofthe case
at bar. In Gilmer, the Petitioner agreed to arbitrate statutory claims in
a contract covered by the FAA. Id. at 23-24. As will be discussed
below, the FAA does not apply to collective bargaining agreements and
thus has no relevance for Ms. McCoy. Moreover, the differences
between employment in a union and a non-union setting are dispositive
of whether an employee will be bound by an agreement to submit
statutory claims of employment discrimination to binding arbitration.
As Gilmer declares, if an individual agrees to arbitrate such a claim, the
contract is binding. Id. at 23. However, according to Gardner-Denver,
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arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements are not
enforceable, and employees maintain their federal rights of action in
discrimination cases. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58.
C.

Courts after Gilmer continue to apply GardnerDenver and its progeny to disputes involving the
submission of statutory claims to arbitration in
the context of collective bargaining agreements.

In Claps v. Molitemo Stone Scales, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 141 (D.
Conn. 1993), the employer, invoking the rationale of Gilmer, contended
that under the language of the operative collective bargaining agreement,
the plaintiffs Title VII sex discrimination claim was to be submitted to
binding arbitration. The Caps court declared that Gardner-Denver, not
Gilmer, controls when the commitment to binding arbitration of a
statutory rights grievance is found in a collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 146-47. The court declared the continued vitality of GardnerDenver after Gilmer:
There is nothing in Gilmer to suggest that the Court
abandoned or even reconsidered its efforts to protect
individual statutory rights from the give-and-take of the
. collective bargaining process ... the Court went out of
its way in Gilmer to contrast its holding with GardnerDenver, Barrentine, and McDonald: the Court noted..
the tension between collective representation and
individual statutory rights . . . In recognizing the
distinction, the Court made it clear that its holding in
Gilmer simply applied to contracts made by employees
individually. Consequently, Gilmer does not alter or
undermine the protection established in Gardner-Denver
against waiver of individual statutory rights through
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collective-bargaining agreements.
Id. Claps supports the proposition that the holding of Gardner-Denver
remains sound with respect to employees working under collective
bargaining agreements. Under the Claps rule, to protect Ms. McCoy's
claim from the vagaries of the grievance-arbitration process, in which
the AUCP would control the presentationof her grievance, the Petitioner
should be allowed to pursue an independent federal remedy.
While the weight of well-reasoned authority supports the
Petitioner's view, at least one court has held that Gardner-Denverdid not
survive the Court's holding in Gilmer. Austin v. Owens-BrockwayGlass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 432
(1996). In Austin, without first submitting her claim to arbitration as
required under the governing collective bargaining agreement, the
appellant sought a federal remedy for violation of her rights under Title
VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Id. The Fourth
Circuit, emphasizing language both in the legislative history and in the
statutes themselves, which encourage alternate dispute resolution of
disability and Title VII claims, held Austin was required to submit her
statutory discrimination charge to binding and final arbitration pursuant
to the contract. Id. at 881. The court recognized no distinction between
individual employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements,
but instead held, "There is no reason to distinguish between a union
bargaining away the right to strike and a union bargaining for the right
to arbitrate." Id. at 885. This holding suggests that Gilmer eliminated
Gardner-Denver's protection of individual statutory rights from the
uncertainties of the collective bargaining process.
However, Austin should play no role in resolving the instant
dispute. The weight ofjudicial authority demonstrates a reluctance to
follow the Fourth Circuit's cavalier disregard of language in Gilmer
clearly emphasizing the distinction between individual employment
contracts and collective bargaining agreements as dispositive in
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assessing when an agreement to arbitrate is enforceable. Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 35. Moreover, the rationale of Austin itself is not compelling.
Judge Widener, writing for the majority, emphasized that since unions
are allowed to waive the right to strike and other protections afforded to
employees under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), they
should also be allowed to bargain away the entitlement-of employees to
vindicate individual statutory rights in federal court. Austin, 78 F.3d at
885. The flawed nature of this argument was addressed by Judge Hall,
dissenting in Austin, in which he distinguished collective rights under
the NLRA from the individual protections contained in antidiscrimination statutes:
Title VII, on the other hand, stands on plainly different
ground; it concerns not majoritarian process, but an
individual's right to equal employment opportunities.
Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a
congressional command that each employee be, free
from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights
conferred can form no part of the collective bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.
Id. at 886-87. The majority's holding, furthermore, fails to consider the
other reasons, explored in Gardner-Denver and its progeny, as to why
arbitration of statutory claims is inappropriate in the context of
collective bargaining. Unions may prefer the interests of the majority
over those of an individual without compromising their duty of fair
representation, thus undermining the important congressional policies
which discrimination statutes seek to vindicate. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at
742. Indeed, conflicts between the collective good and the interests of
an individual are common. Furthermore, requiring employees to submit
their statutory claims to binding arbitration, in which the presentation of
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the grievance is controlled by the employee's union, divests the
individual of the ability to ensure the claim is pursued in a manner which
will best combat the discrimination encountered by the employee.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19. Finally, to give control over the
prosecution of statutory claims to unions, former bastions of
discriminationthemselves, would, as Justice Burger observed, make "the
foxes guardians of the chickens." Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 749-50. The
better view, as expressed by the Court in Gardner-Denver, and later
reaffirmed in Gilmer, is to allow employees working under collective
bargaining agreements, such as the Petitioner, to pursue their statutory
claims in federal court, regardless of the contract's commitment of such
disputes to binding and final arbitration.
D.

As Ms. McCoy works under a collective
bargaining agreement, the Federal Arbitration
Act does not require her to submit statutory
claims to arbitration.

Respondent is likely to contend that pursuant to the FAA "a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction ... [is] valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
This argument appears to justify compelling arbitration in the instant
dispute. However, the FAA also contains an exclusionary clause which
provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1.
Respondent's argument thus fails, as Section 1 excludes employment
contracts from the ambit of the FAA. Moreover, the FAA does not
govern collective bargaining agreements.
In Bacashihuav. U.S. Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1988),
the court addressed whether the FAA applies to collective bargaining
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agreements. The plaintiff in Bacashihua sought to avoid the FAA's
three-month limitation on motions to modify arbitration awards, under
which her claim would have been time-barred, by arguing that
arbitration clauses in collectively-bargainedcontracts are not within the
ambit of the FAA. Id. at 403-04. The Sixth Circuit agreed, citing the
Supreme Court in Misco:
The Arbitration Act does not apply to "contracts of
employment of . . . workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce," but the federal courts have often
looked to the Act for guidance in labor arbitration cases,
especially in the wake of the holding that § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 empowers
the federal courts to fashion rules of federal common
law to govern "[s]uits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization" under federal
labor laws.
Id. at 404 (quoting United Paper Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v.
Misco. Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987)). Construing the Court's
language in Misco, Bacashihua declared, "With the benefit of the
Supreme Court's guidance, this Court recently... determined that § l's
exclusion does pertain to labor contracts." Id. The Sixth Circuit thus
joined in the view expressed by Justice Stevens, Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 4041 (Stevens, J., dissenting), that according to Textile Workers Union of
America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (1957), enforcement of
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements is governed by
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act rather than the
FAA. Bacashihua, 859 F.2d at 404. Hence, the agreement to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims contained in the collectively-bargained
contract under which Ms. McCoy worked is not enforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act, and the Petitioner retains her federal right of
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action.
II.

DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS SHOULD REMAIN
COGNIZABLE UNDER THE ADEA SO AS TO
EFFECTUATE THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF
THE ACT AS WELL AS RECOGNIZE THE
CURRENT PRECEDENT SUPPORTING SUCH
CLAIMS IN THE MAJORITY OF CIRCUITS.

Since Gardner-Denver and its progeny secure the Petitioner's
right to seek relief in federal court, this Court must determine whether
she may bring a disparate impact claim under the ADEA. The recent
split between the circuits regarding this issue should be resolved in favor
of recognizing the disparate impact theory. The ADEA, passed in 1967,
is a hybrid of Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). See
Barbara Linderman and Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination
Law 556 (3rd ed. 1996). Generally, the substantive provisions of the
ADEA were based on Title VII, and the procedural aspects were based
on the FLSA. Id.
A.

Where the substantive provisions of the ADEA
were based on Title VII and the purpose of the
two acts is the same. a disparate impact claim is
cognizable under the ADEA.

When the ADEA was passed, its purpose was the same as Title
VII: to eliminate discrimination in the workplace and insure that all
individuals would have equal opportunities in employment. Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). "There are important similarities
between the two statutes ...

both in their aims--the elimination of

discrimination from the workplace--and in their substantive prohibitions.
In fact, the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from
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Title VII." Id. Since 1971, disparate impact claims have been
cognizable under Title VII, even absent an explicit statutory grant. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). This Court held in
Griggs that the purpose of Title VII was "to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers . ..

.

[P]ractices,

procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 429-30. Because the
purpose of the ADEA and Title VII is the same, and because Title VII
recognizes that disparate impact claims are necessary to eradicate
discrimination, the ADEA must recognize disparate impact claims as
well.
1.

The legislative history of the ADEA
suggests that disparate impact claims
are cognizable.

The purpose of the ADEA is to "promote employment of older
persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways
of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). In a report submitted to Congress prior to the
enactment of the ADEA, the Secretary of Labor stressed that "[t]o
eliminate discrimination in the employment of older workers, it will be
necessary not only to deal with overt acts of discrimination, but also to
adjust those present employment practices which quite unintentionally
lead to age limits in hiring." U.S. Department of Labor, Report to the
Congress on Age Discrimination in Employment under Section 715 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 22 (1965). An employment practice could
be unlawful, even absent intent to discriminate, if it limited an older
individual's employment opportunities.
Congress recognized that "older. workers find themselves

948

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XIII

disadvantaged in their efforts to retain or regain employment, that
arbitrary age limits and certain other practices may work to the
disadvantage of older persons." H.R. Rep. No. 805 (1967), reprinted in
1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2220. Thus, Congress intended the ADEA to
eradicate practices that unintentionally disadvantaged older employees,
as well as those that intentionally discriminated against them.
2.

The statutory language of the ADEA
supports recognizing disparate impact
claims.

The ADEA specifiesthat it is unlawful for an employerto "limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would . . .
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1994). By prohibiting practices that
"adversely affect" older employees, the statutory language prohibits
behavior that has an "adverse impact" or "disparate impact" on older
employees. The statute does not use the word "discriminate," but rather
"imposes liability for employment practices that 'adversely' affect an
employee's 'status', and nowhere includes an intent requirement."
Michael C. Sloan, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in
EmploymentAct: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L. Rev.
507, 517. Since identical language under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994)
of the Civil Rights Act supports recognizingdisparate impact in the Title
VII context in the Griggs decision, this language supports disparate
impact under the ADEA as well. Id.
Recently, several courts have adopted this argument in holding
that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA. "The
phrase 'or otherwise adversely affects' implies that an employment
practice may constitute illegal discrimination even if not intended or
directed specifically at age. Thus, the phrase not only prohibits
intentional discrimination but also forbids any policy having a more
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harmful effect on older people than on their co-workers." Caron v. Scott
Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 37-38 (D. Me. 1993); see also Camacho v.
Sears Roebuck de Puerto Rico, 939 F. Supp. 113, 120 (D.P.R. 1996).
Other language supporting a disparate impact claim can be
found under Section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA, which states that
differentiation in employment practices is not unlawful where such
"differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f)(1) (1994). Under the canon that the mention of one thing
excludes another (expressio unius est exclusius alterius), by explicitly
permitting only "reasonable" factors, Congress suggested that an
employment decision based on unreasonable factors is unlawful. "The
inclusion of these exemptions suggests that Congress thought the
ADEA, without exemptions, would prohibit all facially neutral policies
with adverse effects on older workers." Caron, 834 F. Supp. at 37 n.4.
The unreasonable factors need not be discriminatory; they must only
have an adverse or disparate impact on older individuals. Had Congress
intended to preclude disparate impact claims, it would have changed the
language to "any factor other than age." By requiring that a factor be
reasonable, Congress intended for the employer to "demonstrate the
reasonablenessof the challenged practice-a burden essentially identical
to that required to defeat a claim of disparate impact under Title VII."
Camacho, 939 F. Supp. at 122.
Although Title VII does not have an identical "reasonable
factor" clause, it does recognize the business necessity defense. Title
VII and the ADEA arguably have different provisions because
"Congress intended employers to have more leeway in considering
factors that disparately affect older workers under the ADEA than
factors that disparately affect classes protected under Title VII." EEOC
v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist., 893 F. Supp. 927, 932 (C.D. Cal.
1995). Although the burden of demonstrating "reasonableness" may be
lower in ADEA claims, the test is the same: Does the practice
disparately impact older individuals, and if so, is the practice
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reasonable?
3.

The codification of the Title VII
disparate impact theory under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 does not preclude a
disparate impact claim under the
ADEA.

In 1991, Congress codified the principles of the disparate impact
theory in its amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994). Although Congress did not amend
the ADEA at that time, such inaction in no way reflects an intent to
preclude disparate impact claims under the ADEA. See Hiatt v. Union
Pac. R.R. Corp., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1435 (D. Wyo. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d
838 (10th Cir. 1995). But se Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999,
1008 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2500 (1996) (inaction signaled
Congress's intent not to provide a disparate impact claim under the
ADEA); Martincic v. Urban RedevelopmentAuth. of Pittsburgh, 844 F.
Supp. 1073, 1078 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (failure to codify disparate impact in
the ADEA was not an oversight).
It would be improperto interpret Congress's silence with respect
to the ADEA as a "conscious omission," for "the Supreme Court has
repeatedly cautioned the lower courts as to the dangers inherent in
attempting to infer some affirmative intention from congressional
silence or inaction." Hiatt, 859 F. Supp. at 1435 (citing Schneidewind
v, ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988)). There are many reasons
why Congress may not have codified the ADEA in 1991. Id. For
instance, Congress may have been preoccupied with amending Title VII,
rather than presenting arguments for or against extending the disparate
impact doctrine to the ADEA. Id. Until Congress or this Court
explicitly precludes ADEA disparate impact claims, they remain
cognizable under the ADEA.
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Precedent amongst the circuit courts supports
the recognition of disparate impact claims under
the ADEA.

Even absent codification of the disparate impact doctrine under
the ADEA, a majority of circuits have recognized disparate impact
claims. Most have relied on the similarities between the language and
the purpose of Title VII and the ADEA in holding that to prove disparate
impact, the "plaintiff need not show that the employer was motivated by
a discriminatory intent; he or she need only demonstrate that a facially
neutral employment practice actually operates to exclude from a job a
disproportionate number of persons protected by the ADEA." Leftwich
v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 945 (1981)).
Julie McCoy has demonstrated that Puerta Pacific College's
Profit Plan has a disproportionate impact on older individuals in that it
discourages hiring professors with more experience because of their
mandatory higher salaries. Ms. McCoy's expert witness has produced
data that 87.4% of all college professors in the State of Wagner between
the ages of forty and fifty-five have more than ten years of experience
and are paid more than $40,000 per year. (R. at 15.) In contrast, only
23% of all college professors between the ages of twenty-five and thirtynine have over ten years of experience and only 13.9% are paid more
than $40,000 per year. (R. at 15.) Thus, if the College wanted to hire
someone with less than ten years of experience, only 12.6% of persons
forty and above would be eligible, whereas 77% of people younger than
forty would be eligible. Furthermore, even where older employees are
willing to accept a lower salary, they would be unable to since, when the
College created the Profit Plan without the input of the union, it made
the salaries absolute and mandatory. (R. at 2.).
To determine whether an employment practice has a disparate
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impact on a protected class, the EEOC has developed the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D)
(1996). These guidelines adopt a "four-fifths rule" or "eighty percent
rule" which establishes that a practice is discriminatory if the pass rate
for a protected class is less than four-fifths, or eighty percent, of the pass
rate of the group with the highest pass rate. Id. Under the Profit Plan,
only 12.6% of persons forty and above could be selected for a position
requiring less than ten years of experience, a figure which is only 16.6%
(significantly less than the required 80%) of the eligibility rate of
persons younger than forty. Under the 4/5 test, Ms. McCoy has shown
that the Plan hinders the opportunity of older adults to gain employment.
Therefore, she has a cognizable disparate impact claim under the ADEA.

1.

Disparate impact claims have been
recognized by the circuit courts since
1980.

For seventeen years, older plaintiffs have relied on the disparate
impact doctrine to rectify age-related inequities in the workplace. In
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1034 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 945 (1981), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff established a violation of the ADEA by proving that a school's
facially neutral policy of not hiring teachers with more than five years'
experience had an adverse affect on older teachers. The plaintiff showed
that 92.6% of teachers between forty and sixty years old had more than
five years of experience, whereas only 62% of teachers under forty had
more than five years experience. Id. at 1030. The court found the
school's policy "discriminatory as a matter of law . . . since, absent
countervailing statistics, the likelihood of a person over 40 being
selected under the policy would be substantially less than that of a
person under forty." Id. at 1033. The court rejected the school's defense
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that the decision was based on economic factors rather than age, in part
relying on regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor when it
administered the ADEA:
To classify or group employees solely on the basis of
age for the purpose of comparing costs, or for any other
purpose, necessarily rests on the assumptionthat the age
factor alone may be used to justify a differentiation-an
assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and
the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so
based would serve only to perpetuate and promote the
very discrimination at which the Act is directed.
Id. at 1034 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h)(1979) (repealed 1987)).
Under this argument, Puerta Pacific College's policy of
classifying professors based on experience, which has a direct
correlation to age, would be the exact type of behavior the ADEA aims
to prohibit. Such differentiation perpetuates a system that disadvantages
older workers and limits theirjob opportunities, especially when they are
willing to accept salaries below the designated level. It is significant to
note that when the Supreme Court denied certiorari for Geller, Justice.
Rehnquist dissented, arguing that "[t]his Court has never held that proof
of discriminatory impact can establish a violation of the ADEA."
Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945,948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Despite Justice Rehnquist's rejection of the disparate impact doctrine
under the ADEA, the majority of courts continued then; and continue
today, to recognize such claims.
Even if an employer never explicitly mentions age as a factor,
reliance on tenure status or level of experience may be a discriminatory
practice that adversely affects older individuals. Leftwich v. HarrisStowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983). In stressing
Congress's concern about the difficulty older workers face in obtaining
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and retaining employment, the court held that "because of the close
relationship between tenure status and age, the plain intent and effect of
the defendants' practice was to eliminate older workers ... ." Id. at 691.
The Leftwich court also considered EEOC regulations that
modified the Department of Labor regulations relied upon in Geller: "A
differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees
as a group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans
which qualify for the section 4(f)(2) exception to the Act." Id. at 691-92
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f) (1981)). Although these guidelines are
not binding, they are indicative of the motivation and intent behind the
ADEA. The Leftwich court found them convincing and held that the
college's faculty selection plan, which reserved certain positions for
non-tenured faculty only, was discriminatory in that it had a disparate
impact on older tenured professors. Id. at 690.
Even the Seventh Circuit, which has recently rejected the
disparate impact doctrine under the ADEA, gave credence to these
guidelines in holding that an employer's act of replacing a twenty-seven
year old veteran of the company with a younger, lower-salaried
employee was discriminatory. Metz v. Transit Mix. Inc., 828 F.2d 1202,
1207 (7th Cir. 1987). The Metz court stated, "The ADEA has
consistently been interpreted by the administrative agencies charged
with its enforcement and the courts to prohibit an employer from
replacing higher paid employees with lower paid employees in order to
save money." Id. at 1205. In fact, as late as 1992, after the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written
by Judge Posner, recognized that "the weight of authority ... is that
disparate impact is a viable doctrine under the age discrimination law."
Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
For over a decade, the established law in the majority of circuits has
recognized disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Such support
indicates that the disparate impact doctrine effectuates the purpose
behind the ADEA and helps deter the discriminatory practices which
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were so prevalent before its passage in 1967. To disregard these claims
now, seventeen years later, would harm older workers across this nation,
as well as the courts aiming to protect them.
2.

The dicta in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
regarding the cognizability of disparate
impact claims under the ADEA is not
dispositive.

In 1993, this Court ruled in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604 (1993), that firing an employee shortly before his pension
vested did not constitute disparate treatment under the ADEA, since
although pensions correlate with age, they are not the "statutory
equivalent" or proxy for age. Id. at 612-13. In the opinion, the majority
stated that "[d]isparate treatment . . . captures the essence of what

Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA." Id. at 610. In dicta, the
Court also clarified that it has never decided whether the disparate
impact doctrine is available under the ADEA, but that it need not do so
at that time. Id. at 610. The concurrence elaborated on this dicta in
stating that "nothing in the Court's opinion should be read as
incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called 'disparate impact'
theory ... there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry

over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA." Id. at 618
(Kennedy, J., concurring). As mentioned earlier, Chief Justice
Rehnquist made a similar argument twelve years earlier in his dissent in
Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981). Yet courts continued to
recognize disparate impact claims then, and they should continue to do
SO.

Since Hazen, several courts have interpreted its dicta to mean
that disparate impact claims are no longer viable under the ADEA. See.
e.g., Ellis, 73 F.3d at 1009 (one cannot read Hazen without the strong
impression that the Supreme Court is suggestingthat the ADEA does not
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encompass a disparate impact claim); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham
Coq., 48 F.3d 719 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 306 (1995) (doubtful
that disparate impact theory is viable theory of liability under the
ADEA); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2577 (1995) (decisions based on criteria which
merely tend to affect older workers more adversely are not prohibited).
Without definitive guidance from this Court, those circuits
prematurely abolished the disparate impact doctrine under the ADEA.
See Newport Mesa, 893 F. Supp. at 930. There is no statutory direction
to warrant such action, and, in fact, the legislative history and case law
prior to Hazen support keeping the doctrine under the ADEA. Perhaps
one court summed up the situation best: "Though these considerations
may show the direction in which the winds are blowing, they are not the
stuff on which a trial court may base its interpretation of the law."
Camacho, 939 F. Supp. at 121.
3.

Even after the decision in Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, a majority of circuits
have continued to recognize disparate
impact claims under the ADEA.

The majority of circuits have continued to recognize the
disparate impact doctrine even after the Hazen decision. To date, only
the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have rejected disparate impact
claims under the ADEA. But see Noreuil v. Peabody Coal Co., 96 F.3d
254, 259 (7th Cir. 1996) (viability of ADEA disparate impact claim still
unresolved in this circuit).
In remainingjurisdictions,the disparate impact doctrine remains
cognizable under the ADEA. See Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d
1466 (8th Cir. 1996); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 53 F.3d 135 (6th Cir.
1995); Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir.
1995); Roemer v. Pub. Serv. Co., 911 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1996);
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Lewis v. Aerospace Community Credit Union, 934 F. Supp. 314 (E.D.
Mo. 1996); Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1996);
Brothers v. NCR Corp., 885 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ohio 1995); Finch v.
Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Del. 1994); Graffam v. Scott Paper
Co., 848 F. Supp. 1 (D. Me. 1994); Fisher v. Asheville-Buncombe
Technical Community College, 857 F. Supp. 465 (W.D.N.C. 1993), aff'd
25 F.3d 1039 (4th Cir. 1994).
Given the overwhelming precedent in support of preserving the
disparate impact doctrine and the legislative history indicating that the
doctrine effectuates the Act's mission, this Court should find disparate
impact claims viable under the ADEA.

III.

PUERTA PACIFIC'S ASSERTION OF THE ADEA'S
BUSINESS
NECESSITY
DEFENSE
FAILS
BECAUSE ITS DISCHARGE OF McCOY FOR
ECONOMIC REASONS DOES NOT QUALIFY AS A
REASONABLE FACTOR OTHER THAN AGE.

Puerta Pacific's argument that it fired Ms. McCoy as the result
of a business necessity fails under the intent of the legislators and under
recent case law. The ADEA provides a defense for the employer,
allowing age-motivatedemployment decisions where "age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Therefore,
Puerta Pacific will assert the "business necessity defense" and claim that
its discharge of Ms. McCoy was motivated by economic constraints
critical to its financial viability, citing such concerns as reasonable
factors other than age. However, its assertion of the business necessity
defense fails in light of the intent of the legislators in passing the ADEA.
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Puerta Pacific's assertion of the business
necessity defense based on economic concerns
fails because it opposes the legislative intent of
the ADEA.

When it enacted the ADEA, Congress was clear that the
legislators' primary concerns centered on the challenges older workers
face in their attempts to obtain or retain employment. H.R. Rep. No.
805 (1967), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2220, cited in Leftwich v.
Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983).
Although Congress catered to business interests when it included the
business necessity defense, the initial Department of Labor regulations
highlighted the defense's limited application in noting that "a general
assertion that the average cost of employing older workers as a group is
higher than the average cost of employing younger workers. as a group
will not be recognized as a differentiationunder the terms and provisions
of the Act, unless one of the other statutory exceptions applies. 29
C.F.R. § 860.103(h). The EEOC tempered the Department of Labor's
stand somewhat, indicating in its regulations that, "a differentiation
based on the average cost of employing older employees as a group is
unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans.. . ." 29 C.F.R.

§ 1625.7(f) (1996). Nevertheless, the legislative and administrative
mandate remains unchanged: the business necessity defense is available
to employers on a limited basis and should be strictly construed.
B.

Case law has consistently held that the business
necessity defense is not available where the only
factors cited by the employer are economic in
nature.

When the Second Circuit strictly construed the business
necessity defense in Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980),
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cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981), this Court refused certiorari, thus
upholding the limited application of the defense in ADEA claims. In
Geller, a fifty-five-year-old teacher was hired by a Connecticut school
district, only to be replaced two weeks later by a twenty-five-year-old
applicant. Id. at 1030. In response to the teacher's subsequent ADEA
claim, the school district asserted the business necessity defense,
claiming that it was effectuatinga necessary "cost-cuttingpolicy" which
required that it hire new teachers who only had less than five years
experience. Id. The Second Circuit struck down the school district's
defense by reference to the Department of Labor regulation cited above,
supporting the argument that because the regulation expresses the
ADEA's legislative intent, a court should follow it and disallow the
business necessity defense where the employer's motivation for
discrimination is economic. Id.
In regard to Ms. McCoy's ADEA claim, Puerta Pacific's
assertion that its economic stature required it to discharge her must be
similarly scrutinized. Puerta Pacific's contention that its austere
financial situation forced it to hire only professors with, less than five
years experience and to pay such professors no more than $28,000 in
their first year, (R. at 2), is identical to the salary plan which the Geller
court readily refused to consider as a defense. Id. Puerta Pacific's link
of experience to pay unfairly discriminates against older employees and
the College should not be permitted to rely upon its allegedly poor
financial condition to cloak its otherwise discriminatory conduct.
The Eighth Circuit considered similar discriminatory conduct
and also limited the application of the business necessity defense in
Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
In Leftwich, a tenured forty-seven-year-old college professor with
superior qualifications was refused a new tenured position when the
college for which he worked became a part of Missouri's state college
system. Id. at 689. When the college asserted the business necessity
defense in response to the professor's ADEA claim, the Eighth Circuit
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denied the defense. Id. at 691. The Leftwich court found that although
the selection plan the college used to choose which professors to retain
was based on tenure status, "because of the close relationship between
tenure status and age, the plain intent and effect of the defendants'
practice was to eliminate older workers who had built up ... higher
salaries than their younger counterparts." Id. The Leftwich court held
that "[i]f the existence of such higher salaries can be used to justify
discharging older employees, then the purpose of the ADEA will be
defeated." Id.
Puerta Pacific's assertion of the business necessity defense
similarly defeats the purpose of the ADEA. The College's Profit Plan
effectively eliminates older workers by requiring that new professors
have only five years experience and be willing to accept a teaching
position at nominal pay. (R. at 2.). Therefore, the District Court's
finding that Puerta Pacific demonstrated a business necessity for its
discharge of Ms. McCoy, (R. at 16), was erroneous and should be
overturned by this Court.

C.

The district court's finding that Puerta Pacific
met the business necessity defense is improper
because its reliance on Wards Cove is
inapplicable in light of more recent
Congressional interpretation.

Under misplaced analysis, the district court held that Puerta
Pacific demonstrated a business necessity for its Profit Plan because of
economic strains the college faced. (R. at 16.). Since the court of
appeals below did not reach the business necessity defense, (R. at 1923), this Court must consider the district court's reasoning in reaching
its own decision. In its reasoning, the district court relied on Abbott v.
Federal Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 875 (6th Cir. 1990), which held that
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"minimizing the cost of labor is a legitimate business consideration."
However, its reliance was misplaced because the Abbott court applied
a standard for business necessity that is too low and is not supported by
legislative intent or by case law.
The Abbott court found that the minimization of the cost of labor
"is a legitimate business consideration." Id. In its decision, the Sixth
Circuit declared that its reliance was based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989),
where the Court held that to meet the business necessity defense, an
employment practice need not be "essential" or "indispensable." Id. at
2126.
However, Congress has since rejected the Wards Cove
characterization of business necessity in its amendments to Title VII
under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a). In
passing the Civil Rights Act of 199 1, Congress noted that "the concept
of alternative employment practice" shall be "in accordance with the law
as it existed on June 4, 1989," the day before the Wards Cove decision.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (1994). Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's
liberal interpretation of economic constraints as business necessity under
Abbott fails in light of Congress's amendments and, therefore, the
district court's decision below, (R. at 16), must be reversed.
D.

Courts that have upheld a business necessity
defense have done so in situations that are
readily distinguishable from the case before the
Court.

In holding that Puerta Pacific met the requirements for a
business necessity defense, the district court relied on judicial precedent
which was readily distinguishable from Ms. McCoy's situation. For
example, the district court in EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist.,
893 F. Supp. 927 (C.D. Cal. 1995), examined a situation in which the
Newport Mesa School District applied a salary structure very similar to
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that applied by Puerta Pacific. The court refused to follow Geller and
Leftwich, rejecting their holdings as improper applications of
Department of Labor regulations addressing disparate impact claims. Id.
at 931. Without providing support for its contention, the district court
determined that the school district's economic concerns were sufficient
to excuse age discrimination. Id.
Furthermore, the Newport Mesa court's holding that "a policy of
considering the potential salaries of two competing applicants is 'based
on . . . reasonable factor[s] other than age'

is inapplicable to Ms.

McCoy, who was not an applicant, but rather an employee, at the time
of the discrimination. Id. at 932. Further, the Newport Mesa court went
on to note that "where salary acts as a proxy for age, consideration of
salary may be no different from direct considerationof age," referencing
a situation far more analogous to Ms. McCoy's. Id. Because Ms.
McCoy was initially hired at a reasonable salary and suddenly replaced
with no warning and with no alternative, (R. at 2), it is likely that Puerta
Pacific's argument that her termination was based on salary fails under
the ADEA and under the reasoning of the Newport Mesa court.

IV.

EVEN IF THIS COURT PERMITS PUERTA PACIFIC
TO ASSERT THE BUSINESS NECESSITY
DEFENSE, THE COLLEGE NONETHELESS
VIOLATED THE ADEA SINCE IT FAILED TO
DISCRIMINATORY
LESS
IMPLEMENT
ALTERNATIVES.

The Newport Mesa court noted that "a disparate impact claim
can survive the employer's reliance on a reasonable non-age cost factor
if the claimant proves there is a less discriminatory means of achieving
the same cost savings." Id. at 933. Puerta Pacific terminated Ms.
McCoy, citing economic necessity as its sole compelling reason, without
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implementation or consideration of other effective, viable alternatives.
(R. at 2). The most obvious option the College should have considered
was to offer Ms. McCoy a similar position at a lower starting salary.
This Court has determined that the fundamental inquiry regarding
alternative measures is whether such measures would be equally
effective in meeting the employer's legitimate business goals. Watson
v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988). Puerta Pacific's
business goals-reducing its financial outlay while offering quality
education-would be much more effectively served by retaining Ms.
McCoy, a twenty-yearlaw enforcementveteran with significantteaching
experience, (R. at 1-2), than by employing Ms. Stubing, a relative
novice. (R. at 3.). Because the College's goals could easily have been
achieved without additional cost, the requirements of the ADEA and
Watson could have been effectively met. Therefore, if Puerta Pacific
successfully asserts a business necessity defense, this Court should still
find for Ms. McCoy because the College failed to implement less
discriminatory alternatives that would have achieved its goals at no
additional cost.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Petitioner respectfully requests
that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Thirteenth Circuit be reversed and judgment be entered in favor of Julie
McCoy.
Respectfully submitted,
Kimberly A. Gossage
DianaL. Puknys
Jeffrey D. Sodko
Wake Forest University School of Law
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APPENDIX
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994)
§ 1.

"Maritime Transactions" and "commerce" defined; exceptions
to operation of title.

"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter
parties, bills of lading of water carriers, agreements relating to wharfage,
supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other
matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy, would
be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; "commerce", as herein
defined, means commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any
such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District
of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce.
§ 2.

Validity, irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate.

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain
employment, and especially to regain employment when
displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for
job performance has become a common practice, and certain
otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of
older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high
among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and
their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this Act to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994)
(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail'or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit; segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this Act.

(f) Lawful practices; age an occupational qualification;other reasonable
factors; seniority system; employee benefit plans; discharge or discipline
for good cause
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections
(a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation
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is based on reasonable factors other than age, or where such
practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign
country, and compliance with such subsections would cause
such employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to
violate the laws of the country in which such workplace is
located.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(1)(A) An unlawful employmentpractice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if-

968

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XIII

(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particularemployment practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is
job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described
in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative
employment practice.

(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the
concept of "alternative employment practice."
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979) (repealed 1987)
(h) It should also be made clear that a general assertion that the average
cost of employing older workers as a group is higher than the average
cost of employing younger workers as a group will not be recognized as
a differentiation under the terms and provisions of the Act, unless one
of the other statutory exceptions applies. To classify or group
employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of comparing costs,
or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that the age
factor alone may be used to justify a differentiation-an assumption
plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and the purpose of Congress in
enacting it. Differentials so based would serve only to perpetuate and
promote the very discrimination at which the Act is directed.
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29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1996)
D. Adverse impact and the "four-fifths rule."
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-fifths
rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as
evidence of adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection rate may
nevertheless constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in
both statistical and practical terms or where a user's actions have
discouraged applicants disproportionately on grounds of race, sex, or
ethnic group. Greater differences in selection rate may not constitute
adverse impact where the differences are based on small numbers and
are not statistically significant, or where special recruiting or other
programs cause the pool of minority or female candidates to be atypical
of the normal pool of applicants from that group. Where the user's
evidence concerning the impact of a selection procedure indicates
adverse impact but is based upon numbers which are too small to be
reliable, evidence concerning the impact of the procedure over a longer
period of time and/or evidence concerning the impact which the
selection procedure had when used in the same manner in similar
circumstances elsewhere may be considered in determining adverse
impact. Where the user has not maintained data on adverse impact as
required by the documentation section of applicable guidelines, the
Federal enforcement agencies may draw an inference of adverse impact
of the selection process from the failure of the user to maintain such
data, if the user has an underutilizationof a group in the job category, as
compared to the group's representation in the relevant labor market or,
in the case of jobs filled from within, the applicable work force.
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29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (1996)
(a) Section 4(0(1) of the Act provides that
* * * it shall not be unlawful for an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization * * * to take
any action otherwise prohibited under paragraphs (a),
(b), (c) or (e) of this section * * * where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age * * *
(b) No precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to the
scope of the phrase "differentiation based on reasonable factors other
than age." Whether such differentiations exist must be decided on the
basis of all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each
individual situation.
(c) When an employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the
defense that the practice isjustified by a reasonable factor other than age
is unavailable.
(d) When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis
for different treatment of employees or applicants for employment on
the grounds that it is a "factor other than" age, and such a practice has an
adverse impact on individualswithin the protected age group, it can only
be justified as a business necessity. Tests which are asserted as
"reasonable factors other than age" will be scrutinized in accordance
with the standards set forth at Part 1607 of this Title.
(e) When the exception of "a reasonable factor other than age" is raised
against an individual claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer
bears the burden of showing that the "reasonable factor other than age"
exists factually.
(f) A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older
employees as a group is unlawful except with respect to employee
benefit plans which qualify for the section 4(0(2) exception to the Act.

